tion." Frege, like Mill before hirn, notices that linguistic meaning is complex and has several components, and one of the components Frege isolates is Mill's denotation. There are good reasons to believe that Frege's reading ofMill had some role to play in Frege's thinking about meaning. Frege's main work between Begriffsschrift and "On Sense and Reference"
was The Foundations 0/ Arithmetic (1884) , where Frege addresses the second step of the overarching project that he began in the Begriffsschrift, namely of trying to see how much of arithmetic he can generate from logic alone. While in the Begriffsschrift he wanted to show that mathematical proofs are logical ones, in the Foundations he aims to show that the concept of a number can also be reduced to the concepts oflogic. To motivate his theory ofnumber, Frege examines the views ofhis predecessors and Mill's empiricist account of number is a primary target. (In the Introduction and Parts 1-111 ofthe Foundations, which comprises the historical and critical discussion prior to Frege's presentation ofhis own theory in Part IV, Frege uses Mill's name more than anyone else's name, including that ofLeibniz. Mill's name is used 31 times while Leibniz's name is used 25 times. There is a large gap between the occurrence ofMill 's and Leibniz's names, and the next most frequently occurring names, which belong to Stanley Jevons (9 times) and Kant (8 times)). Now, since for Mill all truths about matters of fact are synthetic truths known empirically or aposteriori and arithmetic is a source oftruths about matters of fact, Mill believed that arithmetic consisted of synthetic, a posteriori truths. Accordingly, the concept of number had to be defined empirically. Mill believes that we repeatedly recognize groups of objects, say three pebbles, three trees, etc., and "we term all such parcels Threes" (1974, VII: 257) . Moreover, we recognize that these groups can be separated into parts-for instance three pebbles can be separated into a group of two and a single pebble-and this is the basis the arithmetic operations. Frege is particularly critical of this account. Already in the Preface to the Foundations Frege describes this as "gingerbread or pebble arithmetic" and that "the only thing missing is to ascribe to the flavor ofthe case a special meaning for the concept of nunlber" (1884, vii) .
Later he responds to Mill 's text sentence by sentence (1884, 9-11). The section Frege critiques includes this sentence by Mill:
The expression "two pebbles and one pebble," and the expression, "three pebbles", stand for the same physical fact. They are names ofthe same objects, butofthose objects in two different states: though they denote the same things, their connotation is different. (Mill 1974, VII: 256 (Beaney 1996, 308n51) . Mill returns to counting pebbles in his discussion of the laws of nature, where he writes that each name of a number "denotes physical phenomena, and connotes a physical property ofthose phenomena" (1974, VII: 610) . A bit later Mill summarizes his discussion as follows:
What, then, is that which is connoted by a name ofa number? Ofcourse, some property belonging to the agglomeration ofthings which we call by the name; and that property is, the characteristic manner in which the agglomeration is made up of, and may be separated into, parts. (1974, VII: 611) Taking some liberties by transforming Mill' s question into an answer, Frege quotes this text as follows:
The name ofa number connotes [bezeichnet] some property belonging to the agglomeration ofthings which we call by the name; and that property is, the characteristic manner in which the agglomeration is made up of, and may be separated into, parts. (1884, (29) (30) Since he quotes this passage, Frege must have been aware of Mill's distinction between denotation and connotation. Nevertheless, Frege's choice ofwords for Mill's "connotation" in his paraphrase ignores this distinction. The Gennan translation of Mill' s System 0/ Logic by J. Schiel, the translation that Frege cites, clearly distinguishes between connotation and denotation. Schiel consistently used "bezeichnet" for denotation and "mitbezeichnet" for connotation, preserving in German the fact that in English "connotation" and "denotation" have "notation" as a common root (Mi111863, I: 35). So Schiel very appropriately uses "mitbezeichnet" when translating "connoted" in Mill' s question "What, then, is that which is connoted by a name ofa number?" while Frege ignores this in his paraphrase. Instead, Frege, as noted in the quoted text above, uses "bezeichnet. "
This could be taken to mean that in the Foundations 0/Arithmetic Frege was still completely confused about the components ofmeaning and that he did not distinguish denotation from other components of meaning, as he does eight years later in "On Sense and Reference." But this attributes more confusion to Frege than is warranted. A more plausible interpretation is that Frege simply ignored Mill' s concept of connotation, a concept that was too closely tied to subjectivity to be useful for Frege, and instead Frege focussed on denotation and assin1ilated Mill' s connotation to denotation. On this reading, the view Frege is considering in this passage is that number tenns denote properties of objects.
In Gennan, it would be very natural to suppose that connotation The verb "denote [bezeichnen]" also appears in key paragraph §62 ofthe Foundations, which has been described as "arguably the most pregnant philosophical paragraph ever written" (Dummett 1991, 111) . This paragraph lays out the general strategy Frege will use for defining number terms and it is the opening paragraph of a section Frege calls "To obtain the concept 0/ number, the sense [Sinn} 0/ a numerical equation must be determined" (1884, 73) . As the use of"sense [Sinn] " in this title indicates, this is also the text where Frege distills content into two components. The way Frege arrives at sense as the semantic companion to denotation is as follows.
Prior to paragraph §62, Frege had concluded that numbers are neither physical things, physical properties ofthings, nor subjective entities such as mental representations (1884, 58). But if a number "is neither something sensible nor a property of an extemal thing," we cannot mentally represent numbers as such (1884, 70) . Moreover, if we cannot mentally represent numbers, which are the denotations of number terms, and denotation is all there is to meaning the meaning of a word, it follows that we do not have mental representations of the meanings of number terms. This raises a problem for Frege with which he begins paragraph §62 and the section on "the sense 0/a numerical equation":
How, then, shall a number to be given to us, when we cannot have any representations or intuitions of it? (1884, 73) . This is the central question that leads Frege to a notion oflinguistic sense in addition to denotation.
The pivot that gets Frege from denotation to sense is what has come to be called Frege's "context principle" (Dummett 1973 ). Frege maintains that the lack of amental representation for the n1eaning of a number word can suggest that number terms do not have meanings, but this, for Frege, is a mistake. The fact that no representation can be formed of the meaning of a word, Frege writes, "is...no reason for denying it any Bedeutung" (1884, 71). We might be inclined to deny such words meaning ifwe look at words in isolation, but this is amistake. "Only in a complete sentence [Satz] do words really have Bedeutung" Frege writes, appealing to a principle he highlighted in the Introduction to the Foundations as one of the three "fundamental principles" of his inquiry into the nature of number (1884, x and 71) .
What is the meaning of"Bedeutung" in these passages? I think that the discussion so far already suggests that Frege has denotation in mind, but this reading is clinched, I believe, by what Frege writes to elucidate the context principle. After pointing out that this principle "throws light on quite a number of difficult concepts ... and its scope is certainly not restricted to mathematics" (1884, 71), Frege addresses the appearance ofa contradiction between the context principle and a view he defended earlier in the Foundations that a numbers is an "independent object [selbstständiger GegenstandJ" (1884, 68) . The independence ofnumbers might suggest that a number term denotes by itself in isolation from a complete sentence, but Frege rejects this suggestion:
The independence that I am claiming for number is not to be taken to mean that a number word denotes [bezeichnen] something when removed from the context of a sentence... (1884, 72) .
Although numbers are independent objects (and not properties of objects, for example), the context principle still holds for number terms. Frege's use of "denotes [bezeichnen] " to make this clarification regarding the context principle shows that Frege uses "Bedeutung" in the context principle synonymously with "Bezeichnung," the German term used for "denotation" in Schiel's translation ofMill.
Once it is clear that the context principle is about denotation or reference, it is clear how the context principle serves as a strategy for answering his question about how numbers are given to uso Although we have no n1ental representations or intuitions of numbers, they are given to us by means of number terms in the context of whole sentences. Hence, understanding how numbers are given to us "depends on defining the sense ofa sentence in which a nun1ber word occurs" (1884, 73). Frege argues that the sentences we must look for in this inquiry are ones that "express recognition" ofthe number. Frege continues: "ifthe sign a is supposed to denote [bezeichnen] an object for us, then we must have a criterion [Kennzeichen] that decides in all cases whether b is the same as a," and sentences of identity will yield such a criterion (ibid.). "Our aim," Frege writes, "is to construct the content of a judgment that can be understood as an equation on each side of which is a number" (1884, 74) . In other words, we will understand how numbers are given to us ifwe understand the sense of identity sentences involving number terms, e.g. "7+5=12." Frege takes for granted that we have a general concept of identity that is expressed in identity statements, and "by means of this already known concept of identity, obtain that which is to be regarded as identical" (ibid.). So a number term has adenotation, but the way this denotation is given is always in the context of a whole sentence, particularly those expressing numeric identities.
This analysis yields for Frege a notion of meaning in addition to denotation. It is not the case that "an object can be given in one single way" and the "versatile and meaningful use of identities rests ...on the fact that something can be reidentified even though it is given in a different way" (1884, 79) . So although in an identity staten1ent there is only one denotation, nevertheless the identity statement expresses distinct ways in which the object is given, and the way an object is given is another con1ponent of meaning besides denotation.
1believe that in writing the Foundations 0/Arithmetic Frege began to distill the raw concept of meaning or content into two components. More-over, the spaee and effort Frege devotes in the Foundations to responding to Mill's views about the meaning of number terms as weIl as his use of "Bezeichnung," the standard Gennan translation of Mill's term "denotation," strongly suggest that MiIl's System ofLogic played a key role in this distillation proeess. I argue that a elose reading ofthe text suggests that in responding to Mill in the Foundations, Frege first narrows the eoneept of meaning to denotation or Bezeichnung, but this leaves Frege with a remainder that he then isolates in his study of identity statements: how objeets are given to uso Thus Frege is left at the brink ofthe distinetion he draws in his essay "On Sense and Referenee."
